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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Tanya A. Vargas appeals from the district court’s appellate opinion 
affirming the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Vargas guilty of 
misdemeanor eluding a police officer.  On appeal, Vargas argues the district 
court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Vargas’ motion in limine, which  
sought to suppress the investigating officer’s out-of-court and in-court 
identifications of Vargas on the alleged basis that the out-of-court identification 
procedure employed by the officer was impermissibly suggestive. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 At approximately 10:50 p.m. on May 8, 2015, Boise City Police Officer 
Natalie Wing was on patrol in a marked police car when she observed a blue 
Mazda with “a non-functioning taillight” travelling in front of her.  (3/15/16 Tr., 
p.24, L.18 – p.27, L.15, p.41, L.19 – p.42, L.13.)  Officer Wing followed the 
Mazda and called the license plate number of the vehicle into dispatch.  (3/15/16 
Tr., p.27, Ls.20-25, p.29, L.8 – p.30, L.1.)  The registration information returned 
to “an individual out of Ogden, Utah.”  (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.15-18; see also 
3/15/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.8-16.)  After choosing a safe location to conduct a traffic 
stop, Officer Wing activated the “red and blue lights” on her patrol car.  (3/15/16 
Tr., p.28, L.17 – p.30, L.3.)  In response, the driver of the Mazda slowed down 
and “pull[ed] almost to the curb” but did not stop.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-14.)  
Officer Wing “turn[ed] on [her] siren to get the driver’s attention,” at which point 
the driver of the Mazda “accelerated rapidly” and sped away.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.30, 
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Ls.5-14.)  In accordance with police department policy, Officer Wing 
discontinued the pursuit so as not to endanger the general public.  (3/15/16 Tr., 
p.35, L.19 – p.36, L.16.) 
 From the time Officer Wing began following the Mazda to the time the 
driver of the Mazda sped way, approximately two minutes had elapsed.  (3/15/16 
Tr., p.40, L.3 – p.41, L.3.)  During that time, the driver of the Mazda “made 
multiple glances … toward the side driver’s mirror and then back toward the 
road.”  (3/15/16 Tr., p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.10, p.45, Ls.12-20.)  Although it was 
dark outside, the area in which the officer and the Mazda were travelling was 
illuminated intermittently by street lights, and Officer Wing was able to get a good 
look at the driver of the Mazda as the driver looked in her driver’s side mirror.  
(3/15/16 Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33, L.3, p.41, Ls.4-18, p.45, Ls.12-23.)  In fact, while 
in a well-lit intersection, the driver of the Mazda made “almost a full turn toward 
that mirror,” allowing the officer to see the driver’s entire face and her profile.  
(3/15/16 Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33, L.3.)  Based on her observations, Officer Wing 
believed the driver of the Mazda was “a female of Hispanic nationality,” in her 
“mid to upper 30’s.”  (3/15/16 Tr., p.33, Ls.4-12, p.45, L.24 – p.46, L.6.) 
 After she discontinued the pursuit, Officer Wing contacted dispatch to 
conduct a further investigation into the registered owner of the Mazda.  (3/15/16 
Tr., p.37, Ls.11-25.)  That investigation ultimately led Officer Wing to the name, 
Tanya Vargas.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-10.)  Officer Wing pulled up Vargas’ state 
issued identification card and determined from the photograph on that card that 
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Vargas was the individual she had seen driving the Mazda.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.38, 
L.9 – p.39, L.12.) 
 The state charged Vargas with misdemeanor eluding a police officer.  (R., 
pp.8-9.)  Before trial, Vargas filed a motion in limine seeking to suppress Officer 
Wing’s “out of court, and expected in-court, identification[s]” of her, arguing the 
out-of-court identification was the product of an impermissibly suggestive “single 
photograph lineup” and that any in-court identification would be “irreconcilably 
taint[ed].”  (R., pp.41-48.)  After a hearing, the magistrate denied the motion.  
(3/15/16 Tr., p.11, L.8 – p.20, L.8.)  The magistrate questioned whether the 
officer’s act of looking at Vargas’ identification card photograph constituted “a 
lineup in the sense that the cases identify” but ruled that, “even so,” under the 
facts of this case, the reliability of the identifications would be an issue for the 
jury.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.15, L.11 – p.19, L.10.) 
 At the trial that followed, the parties agreed that the only issue before the 
jury was the identification of the driver who eluded Officer Wing.  (3/15/16 Tr., 
p.21, L.10 – p.22, L.19, p.22, L.25 – p.24, L.2.)  Officer Wing testified to having 
identified Vargas from her state issued identification card photograph on the 
night of the charged incident.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, L.11 – p.39, L.18.)  The officer 
also made an in-court identification of Vargas.  (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-10.)  At 
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Vargas guilty of misdemeanor eluding.  
(R., p.81; 3/15/16 Tr., p.68, L.16 – p.69, L.9.) 
 Vargas timely appealed from the judgment (R., pp.82-86) and, on appeal, 
challenged the denial of her motion in limine (R., pp.113-26, 140-51; 11/17/16 
 
 4 
Tr., p.6, L.14 – p.12, L.8, p.21, L.8 – p.28, L.13).  The district court affirmed (R., 
pp.154-63), holding that Vargas failed to show Officer Wing’s identification of her 
“by viewing her driver’s license [sic] photo … was the result of improper (‘tainted’) 
state conduct” (R., p.160).  Specifically, the court reasoned: 
One may have serious concerns about the reliability of the 
identification, but the process leading to the identification is not 
violative of due process.  Had the officer presented a single photo 
lineup to an independent witness due process concerns would 
certainly be apparent.  But those concerns are not apparent when 
the officer is the investigator attempting to locate and identify the 
offender. 
 
(R., pp.160-61.)  The district court also held “[t]he magistrate did not violate 
[Vargas’] due process rights in allowing the officer’s in-court identification,” again 
reasoning, “[r]eliability concerns exist but they are not the product of improper 
police conduct.”  (R., p.161.)   
 Vargas timely appealed from the district court’s intermediate appellate 








Vargas states the issue on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the Appellate Opinion err in affirming the trial court’s 
denial of Ms. Vargas’s motion in limine seeking suppression of 
Officer Wing’s identification of her, both in and out of court? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Vargas failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate’s denial of Vargas’ motion in limine seeking suppression of the 
investigating officer’s identifications of her because, contrary to Vargas’ 
assertions, the investigative methods employed by the officer to confirm for 
herself that Vargas was the individual who eluded her did not implicate, much 






Vargas Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Affirming The 
Magistrate’s Denial Of Her Motion In Limine Seeking Suppression Of The 
Investigating Officer’s Identifications Of Her 
 
A. Introduction 
 Vargas argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial 
of her motion in limine seeking suppression of Officer Wing’s identifications of 
her.  As she did below, Vargas characterizes Officer’s Wing’s use of Vargas’ 
driver’s license photo to identify her as a “single photo lineup” which, she 
contends, is “inherently suspicious and impermissibly suggestive as a matter of 
law.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-13.)  She also argues “[t]he out of court 
identification was so suggestive as to be useless, and it irreconcilably taint[ed]” 
Officer Wing’s in-court identification.  (Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  Vargas’ 
arguments fail.  Application of the law to the facts supports the lower courts’ 
conclusions that the investigative methods the officer employed to confirm 
Vargas’ identity were not impermissibly suggestive and did not implicate, much 
less violate, Vargas’ due process rights.  Vargas has failed to show any basis for 
reversal of the district court’s appellate decision affirming the denial of her 
motion in limine. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
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appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
“If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.”  Id. (citing Losser, 
145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)). 
 “Due process issues are generally questions of law,” over which the 
appellate court exercises free review.  Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. Teresa K. 
v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 (2009) 
(citations and quotations omitted).   
 
C. The Investigative Methods Employed By The Officer To Confirm For 
Herself Vargas’ Identity Did Not Implicate, Much Less Violate, Vargas’ 
Due Process Rights 
 
 “‘Due process requires the exclusion of identification evidence if police 
suggestiveness created a substantial risk of mistaken identification, except 
where the reliability of the identification is sufficient to outweigh the corrupting 
effect of the suggestive identification.’”  Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 
___, 390 P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (quoting State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 892, 
980 P.2d 552, 556 (1999)); accord State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 
123, 137 (2008).  “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of 
identification testimony.”  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977), quoted 
in Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at ___, 390 P.3d at 444; State v. Hoisington, 
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104 Idaho 153, 161, 657 P.2d 17, 25 (1983).  Thus, in cases where police action 
has created a risk of misidentification, Idaho’s appellate courts apply a two-step 
test “[t]o determine whether evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due 
process.”  State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 593, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013) 
(citing Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26).  “First, the defendant must 
establish that the identification procedure was overly suggestive.”  Almaraz, 
154 Idaho at 593, 301 P.3d at 251 (citations omitted).  “Second, if the defendant 
meets that burden, courts consider whether the identification was nonetheless 
reliable under the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “For an 
out-of-court identification to taint an in-court identification, the out-of-court 
identification must have been ‘so suggestive that there is a very substantial 
likelihood of misidentification.’”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137 
(quoting Trevino, 132 Idaho at 892, 980 P.2d at 556). 
 Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Idaho Supreme 
Court have recognized the fallibility of eyewitness identifications.  See, e.g., 
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 109-
14; Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 593, 301 P.3d at 251.  However, both Courts have 
also recognized that, absent “improper police conduct,” the “due process check 
for reliability” does not “come[] into play.”  Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 
228, 241 (2012); see also Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137 (where 
there was “no state action and no police suggestiveness creating a risk of 
misidentification” the witness’ identification was “insulate[d] … from Payne’s 
arguments about the suggestiveness of the single photo lineup”). As explained 
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by the United States Supreme Court in Perry, “[a] primary aim of excluding 
identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances 
… is to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo 
arrays in the first place.”  Perry, 565 U.S. at 241 (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 
112).  “When no improper law enforcement activity is involved … it suffices to 
test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that 
purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous 
cross-examination, protective rules of evidence,” and the giving of appropriate 
jury instructions.  Id. at 233.  In other words, “the Due Process Clause does not 
require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily 
suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”  Id. at 248.  Rather, in 
such circumstances “the evidence (if admissible in all other respects) should be 
submitted to the jury.”  Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). 
 Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case supports 
the district court’s conclusions that Officer Wing’s use of Vargas’ identification 
card photograph to confirm Vargas’ identity did not implicate Vargas’ due 
process rights and that the reliability of the identifications was an issue for the 
jury.  (See R., pp.155-61.)  Although Officer Wing is herself a law enforcement 
officer, her identification of Vargas was not the result of any improper or 
unnecessarily suggestive police activity.  Rather, after the driver of the Mazda 
eluded her, Officer Wing conducted an independent investigation regarding the 
ownership of the vehicle and, in that process, she received Vargas’ name.  
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Following up on that lead, the officer pulled up Vargas’ state issued identification 
card and confirmed for herself that Vargas was the individual she had seen 
driving the Mazda.  Because Officer Wing’s identification of Vargas occurred as 
a result of her own observations and investigation, and was not “procured under 
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement,” Perry, 
565 U.S. at 248, the “due process check for reliability” of the identification did not 
“come[] into play,” Id. at 241.  See also Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 
137. 
 The reasoning of State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), 
relied on by the district court (see R., pp.157-59), is instructive.  “Hooks sold 
cocaine from his car to an undercover police officer who later identified Hooks as 
the seller by obtaining and viewing Hooks’s driver’s license photograph from the 
Department of Motor Vehicles electronic database.”  Hooks, 752 N.W.2d at 82.  
In the prosecution that ensued, Hooks moved to suppress the officer’s 
identification of him “on the theory that it resulted from an unfairly suggestive, 
one-person photographic lineup.”  Id. at 83.  The district court denied the motion, 
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals later affirmed.  Id. at 83-85.   
 Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, the Hooks Court 
explained that “[t]he reason a due process issue arises when a pretrial 
identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive in the typical circumstance is 
that the defendant was unfairly singled out by police for the witness to identify.”  
Id. at 84 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); Foster 
v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969)).  The “traditional” two-part test that examines 
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“whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, 
whether the identification is nonetheless reliable” is “designed to measure 
whether police influence rather than the witness’s own reasoning and 
recollection led to the witness’s identification of the defendant.”  Id. (emphasis 
original, citations omitted).  Where, as in Hooks’ case, “the facts include[d] no 
conceivable identification-inducing interaction between police and the identifying 
witness,” the “constitutional concern about police-induced identification is not 
present.”  Id. 
 In rejecting Hooks’ challenge to the identification procedure employed in 
his case, the Hooks Court explained in detail the reasons “why single-person 
lineups trigger a constitutional concern.”  Id. (emphasis original).  Because the 
police solve crimes and are perceived by the public to be especially credible, 
witnesses place confidence in them and are easily influenced by any suggestion 
that the police have narrowed their own identification of a suspect to one (or very 
few) individual(s).  Id. at 84-85.  Recognizing these concerns, the Hooks Court 
held that “an investigating officer who obtains and observes for himself a driver’s 
license photograph to identify for himself the person he observed committing the 
investigated crime does not implicate that person’s due process rights.”  Id. at 85 
(emphasis original).  Specifically regarding the identification at issue in Hooks’ 
case, the Court reasoned: 
Unlike the eyewitness to whom a single police-supplied photograph 
might suggest the photographed person’s guilt, Officer Urbanski 
could not have been unduly influenced by his own identification 
procedure.  Acting as the investigating officer, Urbanski decided for 
himself which photograph to view to confirm his reasoning that the 
licensed driver of the car that officers stopped leaving the scene of 
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the crime was the offending drug dealer.  The lineup options 
therefore narrowed to a single photograph based on Urbanski’s 
own reasoning, not based on the influence of an authority whose 
narrowing would tend to suggest a particular suspect to a witness. 
 
Id.  Having concluded that the investigative process used by the officer to 
confirm Hooks’ identity did “not raise any fairness concerns that require[d] 
application of [the traditional] two-part test” to determine the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification obtained as a result of improper police conduct, the 
Hooks Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hooks’ motion to 
suppress the identification evidence.  Id. 
 The reasoning and result of Hooks apply with equal force in this case.  
Like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “obtained and observed for [herself]” 
Vargas’ state issued identification card photograph in order to “identify for 
[herself] the person [she] observed committing the investigated crime.”  Hooks, 
752 N.W.2d at 85.  Also like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “could not have 
been unduly influenced by [her] own identification procedure.”  Id.  This is not a 
case in which an officer supplied an identifying witness with a single photograph, 
thereby potentially suggesting to the witness the photographed person’s guilt.  
Rather, like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “decided for [herself] which 
photograph to view” to confirm Vargas’ identity, thereby narrowing the “lineup 
options … to a single photograph based on [Officer Wing’s] own reasoning, not 
based on the influence of an authority whose narrowing would tend to suggest a 
particular suspect to a witness.”  Id.  Because, as in Hooks, the facts of this case 
“include no conceivable identification-inducing interaction between police and the 
identifying witness,” the identification procedure did not even implicate, much 
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less violate, Vargas’ due process rights.  Id. at 84-85.  The district court therefore 
correctly affirmed the magistrate’s order denying Vargas’ motion in limine to 
exclude the officer’s identification testimony at trial. 
 On appeal, Vargas recognizes the rationale of Hooks, but he urges this 
Court to reject it, contending it “directly contravene[es]” the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, and “serves to 
inoculate all identifications made by law enforcement from ever reaching the 
second step of scrutiny under the Manson reliability factors.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.6-11.)  Vargas’ reliance on Brathwaite for the proposition that an analysis of 
the reliability factors articulated in that case is required in every case where a law 
enforcement officer uses a single photograph to identify a suspect because such 
an identification procedure is inherently suggestive finds no support in either the 
law or the facts of that case. 
 In Brathwaite, an undercover police officer purchased heroin from an 
individual whose identity he did not know.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 99-101.  Upon 
returning to police headquarters, the undercover officer gave a second officer a 
physical description of the seller.  Id. at 101.  Suspecting from the description 
that Brathwaite might be the seller, the second officer obtained a photograph of 
Brathwaite and left it in the undercover officer’s office.  Id.  The undercover 
officer viewed the photograph two days later and identified the person in the 
photograph as the individual from whom he had purchased narcotics.  Id. 
 The issue before the Supreme Court in Brathwaite was “whether the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state 
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criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability of pretrial identification 
evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and 
unnecessary.”  Id. at 99.  The Court ultimately answered that question in the 
negative, holding that where an identification is obtained by unnecessarily 
suggestive police procedures, the identification evidence may nevertheless be 
admissible if certain factors – including “the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of 
his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the 
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation” – outweigh 
“the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”  Id. at 109-14.  
Because the petitioner in Brathwaite “acknowledged that the procedure in [that] 
case was suggestive (because only one photograph was used) and 
unnecessary,” id. at 109, the Brathwaite Court weighed the “corrupting effect of 
the suggestive identification” against the reliability factors and ultimately 
concluded the identification was sufficiently reliable to go to the jury, id. at 114-
17. 
 Contrary to Vargas’ assertions, neither the facts nor the holding of 
Brathwaite mandate a conclusion that all police identifications that result from the 
viewing of a single photograph are impermissibly suggestive and require an 
analysis of the reliability factors set forth in that case.  The undercover officer in 
Brathwaite identified Brathwaite as the perpetrator of the crime, not as a result of 
his own investigation, but based on a single photograph supplied to him by a 
second officer who, based on the description provided to him, had formed his 
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own suspicion that Brathwaite was the suspect.  While the Brathwaite Court 
treated that identification procedure as unnecessarily suggestive and, therefore, 
requiring consideration of the reliability factors, nothing in the Brathwaite opinion 
suggests that an identification made by a police officer viewing a photograph he 
or she has obtained for him or herself while investigating a crime is in any way 
suggestive or improper. 
 Notably, in arguing that Brathwaite requires an analysis of the due 
process reliability factors under the facts of this case, Vargas utterly ignores the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry v. New Hampshire, supra, which, as noted 
above, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause does not require a 
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when 
the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive 
circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”  Perry, 565 U.S. at 248; see also 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137 (witness’ identification was insulated 
from due process challenge where there was “no state action and no police 
suggestiveness creating a risk of misidentification”).  In reaching that holding, the 
Perry Court rejected “Perry’s contention that improper police action was not 
essential to the reliability check Brathwaite required,” noting that deterring law 
enforcement from using “improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first 
place” was “a key premise of the Brathwaite decision.”  Perry, 565 U.S. at 241.  
Where, as in this case, the identification was not arranged by law enforcement 
but was instead the product of the officer’s independent investigation, “[t]his 
deterrence rationale is inapposite.”  Id. at 242.  See also Hooks, 752 N.W.2d at 
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84-85; Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]hen a police 
officer who is both an investigator and a witness views a single photograph in 
order to verify a suspect’s identity, the identification procedure is not unduly 
suggestive.” (citation omitted)); Miles v. State, 764 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002) (“[W]here, as here, the police officer is both the investigator and the 
witness, police misconduct is not at issue.”); State v. Manna, 539 A.2d 284, 312 
(N.H. 1988) (police misconduct was not at issue where investigating officer 
identified suspect by obtaining and viewing a single photograph because the 
officer “could not be found through the photo identification process to have 
impermissibly suggested to himself the person whom he arrested” (emphasis 
original)). 
 Because the procedure Officer Wing used to identify Vargas was not the 
result of any police suggestiveness creating a risk of misidentification, the district 
court correctly concluded the identification did not implicate, much less violate, 
Vargas’ due process rights.  (R., pp.160-61.)  As such, any questions regarding 
the reliability of the identification were for the jury to resolve.  See Perry, 
565 U.S. at 245 (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint 
of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to 
screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its 
creditworthiness.”).  Vargas has failed to show the district court erred in affirming 
the magistrate’s order denying her motion in limine to exclude Officer Wing’s out-






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
appellate decision affirming Vargas’ conviction for misdemeanor eluding a police 
officer. 
 DATED this 15th day of August, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Lori A. Fleming___________ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 
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